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BY AUBHIK KHAN
W
hen economists talk about business
fixed investment, they mean the ex-
penditures by firms on equipment and
structures.  Business fixed investment is com-
monly held to be an important determinant of
an economy’s long-run growth. 1
Understanding Changes
In Aggregate Business Fixed Investment
On average, higher levels of such
investments raise production by
increasing the productivity of the labor
force.  While the significance of short-
term changes in business investment is
less widely recognized, the importance
of such changes for the business cycle
has been known to economists since
the beginning of the last century. For
example, many believe that the
current record expansion has been







1 The definition of business fixed investment
used throughout this paper does not include
software expenditures by firms because these
data are not available.
investment in computers and related
equipment.  In this article, I attempt
to explain some of what economists
have learned about how investment




investment is simply the expenditure
required to adjust its stock of capital.
Capital includes all equipment and
structures the plant uses.  The plant
combines capital with other inputs,
such as labor and energy, to produce
goods or services.  When a mining
company acquires diesel engines, it is
investing in equipment.  When an
automobile manufacturer builds a new
warehouse, it is investing in structures.
Because it takes time to manufacture,
deliver, and install new capital goods,
investment expenditures today do not
immediately raise the level of a plant’s
capital.  So investment involves a
planning decision that trades off
present against future earnings.
Investment expenditures today reduce
current profit but increase a plant’s
future possible production and, as a
result, future profit.
Since investment spending
raises future capital and thus the
quantity of goods and services that
may be produced in the future, plants
will tend to adjust their investment
levels in response to forecasted
changes in the market’s demand for
their own output.  Changes in produc-
tivity — the efficiency with which
inputs may be combined to produce
output — will also tend to increase
investment.  For example, if productiv-
ity increases, the firm may be able to
sell more of its product, since it can
offer it at a more attractive price.  The
firm may then expand and more
workers may be hired.  These workers
will need equipment, and, as a result,
investment will rise.
AGGREGATE INVESTMENT
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
When plants anticipate
increased demand for their output or
higher productivity, they will generally
raise their investment spending.  For
most sectors of the economy such
increases in investment occur when
GDP rises, for example, during
economic expansions.  In contrast, if
plants expect a decline in demand,
such as occurs for most plants when
GDP falls, investment spending will
fall.  As a result, aggregate investment —
the sum of all investments by all plants
in the economy — is procyclical: it rises
when output rises and falls when
output falls over the business cycle.
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data will reveal that investment is
much more volatile than output
(Figure 1). 2  During periods of above-
trend growth, aggregate investment
experiences a much larger percentage
rise. Moreover, when growth rates are
below trend, such as during recessions,
aggregate investment falls far more
sharply than does aggregate output.
Indeed, if we use a standard measure
of variability, quarterly investment is
3.4 times more volatile than quarterly
output over 1956 - 1994.3
The reader will likely note
another striking regularity between the
two series: investment and output
almost always move in the same
direction.  For example, in the sharp
recession of the early 1980s, detrended
output fell almost 5 percent, and
concurrently, investment fell more
than 10 percent.4  Plants adjust
investment in anticipation of changes
in output demand, and consequently,
investment moves similarly to output.
It follows that to understand the
FIGURE 1
Investment and Output over the Business Cycle
2 Episodes of negative growth rates in Figure 1
do not imply recessions, at least as they are
commonly understood.  For example, if the
output trend is 3 percent, and actual output
grows at 2 percent, Figure 1 will report –1
percent.  Of course, actual recessions will be
recorded when growth is negative.
3 The percentage standard deviation of output
is 1.4 while that of investment is 4.9, hence the
ratio of 3.4.
business cycle, we must understand
why aggregate investment changes
over time.  As Harvard economist
Robert J. Barro has stated, “As a first
approximation, explaining recessions
amounts to explaining the sharp
contractions in the investment
components” (p. 245).
But to understand why
aggregate investment fluctuates,
economists are learning that they must
understand the decisions of individual
plants.  Such emphasis on the role of
an individual entity characterizes




As with all other forms of
scientific progress, progress in econom-
ics relies on the development of
theories.  The success of these theories
is determined by their ability to
contribute to an explanation of
observed phenomena.  In the study of
investment, this has led to a theory of
how firms choose their levels of
investment.
Traditionally, economists tried
to understand aggregate investment
using an approach that ignored
possible differences across individual
firms.  This approach led to a theory
that relied on the fiction of a represen-
tative firm that undertook all invest-
ment that actually occurred in the
economy. In reality, many firms own
and operate several plants, and
investment decisions are made at both
the firm and the plant level.  But as
long as we examine representative
firms, there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between a firm (an ownership
unit) and a plant (a production unit).
Let’s consider a representa-
tive firm, BIGCAP.  Even if BIGCAP
sees no reason to change the level of
its capital stock, it will nonetheless
have to undertake some maintenance
to sustain capital stock at current
Figure 1 displays detrended quarterly total real business fixed investment and GDP in the
United States in each quarter over the years 1956 – 1994. Since we want to concentrate on how these
series move over the business cycle, we have detrended them. That is, the figure shows changes in
output and investment from their longer-term trends.  These trends were computed using the Band-
Pass Filter developed by Marianne Baxter and Robert G. King in their 1999 paper. Note that the use
of this filter eliminates several years of data at the beginning and end of our series.
4 This co-movement in investment and output
is captured by a correlation coefficient of 0.92
between the two series.  Business Review  Q2 2001   17 www.phil.frb.org
levels, since capital depreciates over
time.  Investment beyond the level
needed to offset depreciation will raise
the stock of capital BIGCAP will have
in the future.  This higher level of
capital will allow BIGCAP to raise
production.  So investment today will
affect future earnings and, thus, future
profits.  Therefore, by undertaking
investment today and building capital,
BIGCAP can influence its future
profits.  The fundamental assumption
of the standard theory of investment is
entirely reasonable: A firm chooses its
stock of capital in order to maximize
its shareholder value.  This is the firm’s
target level of capital.
Adjustment Costs.  How-
ever, modern variants of this theory
make another important assumption:
there is a cost associated with chang-
ing a firm’s capital, the cost of adjust-
ment itself.  In their 1996 review
paper, Daniel Hammermesh and
Gerard Pfann discuss some of the
sources of these adjustment costs.
Adding a new machine takes time.
During installation, the firm must
reallocate production across its other
machines, a move that may overbur-
den these other machines and may
present machine operators with
unfamiliar working conditions.  As a
result, production will fall during this
first adjustment period.  Next, after
the new machine has been installed,
workers must be trained to use it.
Again, the firm will be operating at
temporarily reduced levels of produc-
tivity during this second adjustment
period.
Overall, when a firm installs
new capital goods it incurs internal
costs over and above the cost of the
equipment itself.  These costs reduce
the firm’s profits over the adjustment
period.
Consider what happens if
BIGCAP purchases a new computer to
add to its existing stock.  In addition to
the price of the computer equipment,
5 Figures 2 and 3 were generated by solving
economic models of a firm’s behavior under
different assumptions about the costs of capital
adjustment.
BIGCAP will incur additional costs of
integrating the machine into its
network and setting it up with the
required software.  The nature of these
costs — how they change with respect
to the quantity of investment under-
taken by BIGCAP — is critical in
determining their effect.  Traditional
investment theory assumes that it costs
more, per unit, to install more capital.
Thus, BIGCAP’s cost of installing two
new computers would be more than
twice the cost of installing a single
machine.
Rising costs of adjustment
imply that adjusting capital rapidly
would cost more than doing it gradu-
ally.  So traditional theory said that
firms adjusted to their target capital
stock — that which maximized
shareholder value — slowly in an
effort to reduce adjustment costs.  So
this theory was called the partial
adjustment model.
It is not at all obvious why
the costs of adjustment should rise
with the level of investment.  We
might well think that competent
computer staff, learning from setting
up the first computer, would install the
second in much less time. However,
when rising adjustment costs were
ignored, the model performed very
poorly, since it predicted too much
volatility in aggregate investment.  So
by including rising adjustment costs,
the model better matched the data for
the economy as a whole.
Figure 2 shows how assuming
rising adjustment costs leads to
smoother aggregate investment.  It
displays two possible models of a firm’s
investment over time.5  For each one,
the vertical axis displays the firm’s
current level of investment over time,
as a percentage of its long-run average
level.  Suppose the firm experiences a
rise in productivity, lowering its costs,
or, instead, a rise in expected demand
FIGURE 2
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for its product.  As a result, it chooses
to increase its capital stock so that it
can produce more.  The blue line
indicates the investment the firm will
make if it faces no adjustment costs:
there is a sharp rise in investment as
the firm immediately adjusts its capital
stock to allow it to efficiently increase
production.  Subsequently, when
productivity or demand eventually
returns to normal, there is an equally
dramatic disinvestment episode, as the
firm sells off its excess capital stock.
In contrast, if adjustment costs rise
with the level of investment, the
change in capital is much more
protracted.  Capital partially adjusts in
each period as investment slowly raises
it toward its target value.  As a result,
when the change in productivity or
demand ends, the plant has much less
disinvestment to do.  Investment is
much more gradual under partial
adjustment.
Since we are looking at a
representative firm, total investment
for the economy is the same as this
firm’s investment.  Hence, more
gradual investment at the firm level
means that aggregate investment, that
is, the total investment of all firms,
shares the same properties.
When we compare Figures 1
and 2, we see that the model without
adjustment costs generates an invest-
ment series that is too volatile when
compared with the data.  For example,
in the model without adjustment costs,
the largest deviation of investment
from its trend is 25 percentage points,
but in the data over 1956 – 94, the
largest deviation was 10 percentage
points.  But when we examine the
model with adjustment costs, we see
that it exhibits much less variability in
investment.  As a result, the introduc-
tion of adjustment costs allows for a far
better match with the aggregate data.6
Adjustment Costs Revisited.
The partial adjustment model means
gradual change in investment at the
aggregate level, which matches the
data, but it also means gradual
adjustment in investment at each
individual firm — and this does not
seem to match the data!  When
researchers at the Bureau of the
Census undertook an extensive study
of how manufacturing plants adjusted
their stock of capital, the story they
uncovered was inconsistent with the
predictions of the partial adjustment
model.  Instead of changing capital
slowly and gradually, plants made
capital adjustments that were lumpy,
that is, they would invest a lot at one
time, then refrain from investing for a
while, then invest a lot again, and so
on.  Typically, plant capital remains
roughly constant for long periods of
time, with low levels of associated
investment.  These long episodes of
relative inactivity are interrupted by
sudden bursts of investment spending
that drive large increases in plants’
capital stock over short periods of
time.  The partial adjustment model
with rising adjustment costs predicted
plant-level investment that was too
smooth.  Given the limited success of
the partial adjustment model,
macroeconomists began to reconsider
the plausibility of the assumption
about rising adjustment costs. Indeed,
much of the recent progress in our
understanding of investment has arisen
from replacing the unrealistic assump-
tion of rising costs of adjustment with
a better one. (See How Do Plants
Adjust Their Capital?)
6 It should be noted, however, that the match is
still imperfect.  Adjustment costs reduce
variability too much (the largest deviation from
trend in the model with adjustment costs is
about 5 percentage points).
I
How Do Plants Adjust Their Capital?
n their 1998 paper, Mark Doms and Timothy Dunne examined
capital adjustment at the plant level.  Using the Longitudinal Re-
search Datafile collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, they
studied changes in the capital stock of 13,700 large U.S. manufac-
turing plants over 1972 – 1988.  In terms of the total number of
manufacturing plants, the sample is small: over this period, between 312,000 and
360,000 plants were operating in the manufacturing sector. However, the sample
accounts for approximately 50 percent of total manufacturing production and 40
percent of employment. In addition to including relatively large plants, the sample
is also unusual because all the plants present in the sample in 1972 were still in it
through 1988.
In a typical year, over 80 percent of all plants in the sample undertook
very little capital adjustment: their capital stocks changed less than 10 percent.
But approximately 8 percent of plants adjusted capital by more than 30 percent,
and more than half of the sample experienced capital growth of more than 37
percent in at least one year.
The partial adjustment model, which predicts gradual changes in invest-
ment due to the rising costs of undertaking too much capital adjustment at one
time, cannot explain these sharp, sudden investment episodes followed by long
periods of low adjustment.  Business Review  Q2 2001   19 www.phil.frb.org
As the mathematical sophisti-
cation of researchers in the field
increased, they understood how to
adapt the existing theory of investment
to account for the new observations.
The new theory assumes that the costs
of capital adjustment are unrelated to
the scale of the adjustment.  Much of
the adjustment cost borne by a plant
would now be the same whether it was
adding one, two, or even 10 computers
to its network.
Such fixed costs (fixed because
they are the same regardless of the
amount of investment) lead to lumpy
investment over time at the plant.
Let’s consider BIGCAP once again,
assuming that BIGCAP is a firm that
owns only one plant. BIGCAP
determines its target level of capital,
the level that maximizes shareholder
value in the absence of adjustment
costs. However, BIGCAP will adjust to
this capital stock only if the rise in
shareholder value from doing so is
greater than the fixed cost associated
with the capital adjustment. As
explained by Ricardo Caballero in his
1999 paper, what this means is that a
plant like BIGCAP will adjust its
capital only when the current level of
its capital stock is far enough away
from its target level of capital stock.
If current and target capital
levels are close, there’s not much gain
in shareholder value from adjustment;
the fixed adjustment cost outweighs
the benefits of adopting the target
level of capital. But once it decides to
adjust its capital stock, BIGCAP has
no incentive to move gradually, since
the adjustment cost is independent of
the size of the adjustment.  Notice that
a simple modification of existing
theory has led to a dramatic change in
the model’s predictions.  Investment at
the plant level is no longer slow and
gradual but rather erratic and lumpy.
Plants don’t change their actual capital
in response to small changes in their
target capital.  So there are typically
long periods when plants don’t
undertake much investment. However,
when target capital is sufficiently
different from actual capital, there is
sudden, sharp adjustment.
THE SUM OF INDIVIDUALS:
THE IMPLICATION OF FIXED
ADJUSTMENT COSTS FOR
AGGREGATE INVESTMENT
Fixed adjustment costs seem
to fit the plant-level data quite well.
But how well do they match the
aggregate data?  Before we add up
individual plants’ behavior, we must
understand how these fixed adjust-
ment costs vary across plants and
across time.  Once this is accom-
plished, we will see that the new
model actually fits the aggregate data
better than the partial adjustment
model.
How can a model of lumpy
plant-level investment match the
aggregate investment data, which
show gradual changes in investment?
The answer is that the fixed costs that
are the foundation of the new theory
are assumed to vary both across plants
and over time, that is, fixed costs
behave randomly.
Recall our example of
installing new computers.  Now, let’s
consider the installation of two new
machines, on two separate occasions,
at our hypothetical plant.  For the first
installation, managers may have
available a very competent senior
technician.  He or she may be able to
efficiently integrate the new machine
into the plant’s network.  The cost of
capital adjustment will be relatively
small. However, at a later date, the
senior technician may be unavailable,
and managers may have to rely on a
novice.  This technician, new to the
plant and unfamiliar with its computer
systems, is likely to take far longer to
install the new computer and will
therefore incur a much larger adjust-
ment cost.  A simple way to introduce
such variations into models of invest-
ment is to assume that adjustment
costs are random.
What Do Random Adjust-
ment Costs Mean for Aggregate
Investment?  If these costs differ
randomly across plants and over time,
then even two similar plants are likely
to behave differently because they’ll
have different adjustment costs.
Consider a world full of plants that all
start out with the same level of capital.
Over time, they’ll face different
adjustment costs, and thus, their
capital adjustment behavior will differ.
The difference between a
Plants with larger
capital imbalances
will see higher gains
from adjusting capital,
no matter what the
adjustment cost
plant’s actual and target capital stock
will also differ across plants.  Plants
that had small fixed costs will have
adjusted their capital stocks and be
close to their targets.  Plants that were
less lucky and experienced several
large adjustment costs in a row will
have much larger capital imbalances.
Generally, plant actions will not be
synchronized.  Plants with larger
capital imbalances will see higher gains
from adjusting capital, no matter what
the adjustment cost; hence, they’ll be
more likely to undertake adjustments.
Plants with low capital imbalances will
not be willing to absorb even moderate
adjustment costs and will be unlikely
to adjust capital.  At any time,
someone studying the entire popula-
tion of plants will find that some
actively adjust their capital while
others do not.20   Q2 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Changes in aggregate
investment will arise for two reasons:
changes in the level of investment
undertaken by plants actively investing
and changes in the number of these
active plants.  When there are many
plants, small increases in productivity
or demand that affect most plants will,
generally, induce small changes in the
number of plants actually investing.
But by raising target capital a little, a
few more plants will be induced to
become active and adjust capital.  As a
result, while individual plants may
exhibit lumpy investment, the number
of plants investing will evolve more
gradually, leading to slower changes in
aggregate investment.
We see that the fixed cost
model is able to preserve the success of
the partial adjustment model in
explaining changes in aggregate
investment, while it improves the
match with the microeconomic
evidence on plant-level investment.7
SYNCHRONIZATION AND
BUSINESS CYCLES
The fixed adjustment cost
model and the partial adjustment
model make different predictions
about how investment should behave
over the business cycle.  While plants
will typically not act together in the
fixed adjustment cost model, at other
times, plants will behave in a dramati-
cally more synchronized manner in the
model, mainly whenever there is a
sharp change in some factor that
affects all plants.
Economists agree that plants
are subject to unforeseen events that
can either increase or decrease their
productivity.  For example, a bank
might be subject to new regulation, a
farm might experience a drought, or a
firm might adopt a new type of
steeper decline during years 12 – 14,
the overall impact of synchronization
is to raise investment spending by 4
percentage points.
This is the principal achieve-
ment of the new theory of investment.  By
allowing differences in capital imbal-
8 This is shown in the 1995 paper of Ricardo
Caballero, Eduardo Engel, and John
Haltiwanger and the 1999 paper of Russell
Cooper, John Haltiwanger, and Laura Power.
7 In fact, the fixed cost model is actually better
able to explain aggregate investment than the
partial adjustment model because the partial
adjustment model reduced the variability of
investment too much.  And while the fixed cost
model typically behaves like the partial
adjustment model, at other times it allows for
much sharper changes in investment.  This
undoes much of the excess smoothness of the
partial adjustment model.
technology, for example, newer, faster
computers.
Consider a large unforeseen
rise in future productivity for all plants
— what macroeconomists refer to as a
large shock.  Such a productivity
shock, which might occur at the end
of a recession, will yield a large change
in the target capital of all plants.  As a
result, there will be few plants left with
low capital imbalances, and most
plants will adjust their capital. Their
actions will, to a large extent, be
synchronized. In their 1999 paper,
Ricardo Caballero and Eduardo Engel
show that such synchronization can
lead to a sharp, unusual rise in
aggregate investment.
The black series in Figure 3
represents the total investment of a
group of plants when an extraordinary
change in productivity results in a
sudden synchronization of their
investment.  The blue series presents a
hypothetical alternative case in which
the number of plants allowed to adjust
their capital is constrained to remain
at ordinary levels.  Notice the in-
creased response in total investment
due to the synchronization effect.
Over the first 11 years, investment
initially rises by a total of 17 percent-
age points more in the synchronized
case. While this is partly offset by a
ances across plants to evolve over the
business cycle, the new investment
theory allows the synchronization of
investment activities during episodes
involving large changes in the
macroeconomy. It is through such
episodes that the fixed cost model we
have been examining overcomes the
excessively low variability of invest-
ment in the partial adjustment model.
The fixed cost model provides a
considerably better match with both
the aggregate and the plant-level data
(these models are compared in Figure
4) and can explain the sharp increase
in aggregate investment that follows a
recession.8
CONCLUSION
The theory of investment has
evolved into one that’s now better able
to explain the facts about investment
at both the macro and micro levels.
Traditional theory, known as the
partial adjustment model, ignored
differences across plants and firms. As
a result, while it was reasonably
The fixed adjustment cost model and the
partial adjustment model make different
predictions about how investment should
behave over the business cycle.  Business Review  Q2 2001   21 www.phil.frb.org
successful at explaining aggregate
investment, it did poorly at explaining
lumpy plant-level investment.  Newer
theories that explicitly address plant-
level investment resolve the problems
not addressed by traditional theory.
These new theories of investment
emphasize the role of fixed costs of
capital adjustment in inducing large
but occasional plant-level investment.
Moreover, once it was understood that
these costs were likely to vary across
plants and over time, the fixed cost
theory has been able to explain not
only plant-level investment but also
aggregate investment.  Indeed, by
allowing for unusual synchronization of
investment across plants, fixed cost
theory is able to explain brisk recover-
ies following recessions, something
traditional theory could not do.
Of course, even the new
theory leaves something out. For
example, recent work suggests that
changes in interest rates, ignored in
the new theory, may have powerful
effects on firms’ investment decisions.9
Nevertheless, the new theory certainly
represents progress — it provides an
explanation of changes in aggregate
investment that, in contrast to
traditional theory, is consistent with
our observations of plants’ investment
behavior.
FIGURE 3
Investment With and Without Synchronization
FIGURE 4
Investment Under Partial Adjustment and
With Fixed Costs
9 See the 2000 paper by Julia Thomas and the
2000 paper by both Julia Thomas and me.22   Q2 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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